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Abstract  
 We argue that the ability to coordinate under strategic 
complementarity is substantially affected by mutual interactive development 
at the individual and aggregate level. Optimal strategy which is followed by 
each player does not only depend upon strategy of the other player but also 
on conditions prevailed at the aggregate level. Results of our laboratory 
experiment suggest that certain type of player might be or might be not 
awarded depending on type of the economy, which has important 
implications at the aggregate level with respect to the speed of the 
convergence.  
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Introduction 
 Keynesian coordination problems have received considerable 
attention in many studies, among others Ball, Romer, (1991), Cooper, John 
(1988), Ochs (1995), Cooper, and Haltiwanger, (1993), Oh, Waldmann 
(1994), Haltiwanger, and Waldman, (1989). These studies argue that an 
environment described by strategic complementarity with heterogeneous 
agents might have important implications at the aggregate level. In a 
nutshell, the presence of strategic complements causes that rational agents 
have a tendency to imitate the behavior of naive agents and through that 
multiply the effect of non-equilibrium behavior at the aggregate level. As a 
result the mix of sophisticated and naive agents in the economy in case of 
one time shock will result in an adjustment path similar to pure naive case 
adjustment with only slow movement to equilibrium in an environment of 
strategic complementarity. This mechanism is enabled by the presence of a 
small number of naive agents, whose effect on the adjustment process is 
disproportionally important for the first few periods after the shock. The first 
order effect of small fraction of naive agents at the aggregate level is 
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documented by many studies such as Akerlof and Yellen (1985) or 
Blanchard, Kiyotaki (1987).  
 Coordination issues were also investigated on experimental basis by 
Fehr and Tyran (2007), (2008), Van Huyck et. al (1990), (1991), Russell, 
Thaler (1985). Research of Fehr and Tyran (2007), (2008) suggests that the 
slow adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated monetary shock is 
the case under conditions of strategic complementarity and coordination 
represents a problem. With help of experimental framework similar to Fehr 
and Tyran (2001) we aim to extend the latest research. We argue that the 
ability to coordinate under strategic complementarity is substantially affected 
by mutual interactive development at the individual and aggregate level. 
Optimal strategy which is followed by each player does not only depend 
upon strategy of the other player but also on conditions prevailed at the 
aggregate level. As a result coordination of individual player and 
coordination at the aggregate level has to be distinguished for our purpose. 
Our results suggest that certain type of player might be or might be not 
awarded depending on type of the economy, which has important 
implications at the aggregate level with respect to the speed of the 
convergence. Our conclusions will differ with respect to whether players 
face an environment of real or nominal values.  
 In the next section we introduce experimental design. The following 
section provides us with basic simulations related to the aggregate and 
individual level development. Presentation of the main results of the 
experiment and its comparison with simulations is the content of the next 
section. Summarization of our main findings follows.  
 
Experimental design 
 The following section describes the nature of experimental design 
together with the character of experimental procedures and parameters 
 
General description of Experimental Design  
 Experimental design inspired by Fehr and Tyran (2001) is based on 
n-player pricing game with strategic complementarity and unique 
equilibrium. All n subjects in the role of firms have to set simultaneously 
their nominal prices in each period of the game, but at no cost in any period.  
The experimental game is divided into a pre-shock and post-shock phase, 
with 2T length periods each. The pre-shock phase, which lasts T periods 
serves the purpose of equilibrating the system and is given by M0. 
Afterwards, a fully anticipated negative monetary shock is implemented, 
where money supply is reduced to M1. The post-shock phase then lasts an 
additional T periods. We need to emphasize that the shock was fully 
anticipated and was therefore common knowledge to participants, together 
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with the length of the post-shock phase. Post-shock phase enables to observe 
the character coordination to equilibrium at the aggregate level and also at 
the individual level. In other words we may observe how nominal prices 
adjust in response to the shock in various treatment conditions.  
 The subject´s pricing behavior is governed by the size of pay-offs. 
 The real payoff of subject i, 𝜋𝑖, is given by 
𝜋𝑖 =  𝜋𝑖 (𝑃𝑖,?̅?−𝑖, M)    i=1, ...,  n                        (2) 
 Where 𝑃𝑖 stands for i’s nominal price, ?̅?−𝑖 is the average price of the 
other n-1 group members and M denotes a nominal shock variable (money 
supply). The nominal payoff is expressed as ?̅?−𝑖𝜋𝑖.  
 We use the aforementioned payoff function Fehr and Tyran (2001) in 
our experimental setting with treatment condition, which relates to the form 
in which payoffs are expressed. The payoff can be either real or nominal. 
The real treatment (RH) marks the situation, where subjects receive the 
payoff information for their decision making in real terms. In the nominal 
treatment (NH), subjects receive the payoff information for their decision 
making in nominal terms. In order to compute their real payoffs, subjects in 
the nominal treatment have to divide their nominal payoffs by the average 
price of the other n-1 group members, i.e. ?̅?−𝑖𝜋𝑖/?̅?−𝑖.  
 Additionally, experimental subjects are in a group with other n-1 
human subjects. The aggregate response rule is not known in advance, which 
implies that the subject has to form expectations about price choices of the 
other n-1 human opponents in his group. This induces uncertainty, which is 
substantially higher under nominal frame. As a result we may expect that 
character of coordination may differ depending on the type of frame with 
which subjects have to cope with. 
  
Experimental parameters 
 In our experiment, group size of n=4 is set and remains constant for 
the whole period before and after the shock. Each group has two types of 
subjects, subject of type x and subject of type y, equally distributed within 
the group. The payoff function differs among the players, where x types have 
to select a relatively low price in equilibrium, whereas y types have to 
choose a relatively high price. The money supply before the shock in each 
treatment was given by M0= 42, while in the post-shock phase it was given 
by M1=M0/3=14. The average equilibrium price over all n group members in 
the pre-shock phase is given by ?̅?0
∗=18, whereas in the post-shock 
equilibrium ?̅?1
∗=6. The length of the pre-shock and the post-shock phase is 
T=20. Experimental subjects interact via computer terminals and have to 
select in each period an integer price Pi in interval from 1 to 30. They also 
have to form an expectation 𝑃−𝑖
𝑒  about ?̅?−𝑖. In order to make the appropriate 
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aforementioned decisions the subjects receive information about their 
payoffs in a matrix form (See pay off tables of Fehr and Tyran (2001) for 
more details). The payoff matrices are designed for x and y-types of players 
for all treatment conditions. Either the real or the nominal payoff is present 
in the matrix for each feasible combination of (𝑃𝑖, ?̅?−𝑖). 
 In total, 80 subjects participated in the experiment. 40 subjects 
participated in the nominal treatment NH, 40 subjects participated in the real 
treatment RH. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of 150 CZK. This was also 
the minimum amount, which they could win during the game. The total 
earnings of the subjects in the experiment were approximately 450 CZK on 
average. The experimental session lasted 90 minutes on average. The 
experiment was conducted in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics, 
Prague, in June 2011. In order to experimentally test the subjects’ behavior 
through computers, the Java program was used to set-up the experiment. 
 Aforementioned experiment is not macroeconomic in Walrasian 
sense and rather concentrates on single market. However, this is not a 
problem since temporary macroeconomic models rest on microeconomic 
foundations. Thereby, laboratory experimentation is in line with current 
macroeconomic modelling and the size of experimental sample might be 
considered as a sufficient in order to form relevant conclusions at aggregate 
level. Exactly because macroeconomic models are based on individual 
behaviour, experiments might provide guidance for how subjects perceive 
examined phenomenon. For instance, in the economy with multiple 
equilibriums it might indicate what equilibrium subjects consider as more 
relevant, (Duffy, 1998, 2008).  
 
Simulations of Coordination Issues at the Aggregate and Individual 
Level 
 The so-called coordination problem appears to be a crucial factor 
which may affect the speed of adjustment in the economy after the shock. 
However, coordination as an effort to move quickly towards equilibrium 
with high expectation correction and immediate adjustment is not sufficient 
delineation as emerged during the course of research. In order to explain 
properly this phenomenon we need to distinguish coordination problem at 
the aggregate and individual level for our purpose. Our statements are 
underpinned by simulations based on aforementioned experimental design. 
 
2.1 Coordination at Individual Level 
 Coordination at the individual level is understood as a strategy used 
by each player. Our simulations based on experimental design proved that 
mostly two basic types of players were responsible for the final development 
at aggregate level. Firstly, an adaptive player (AE) is present as a type of 
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player who does not coordinate at all, i.e. “no coordination is present”, and 
his behavior is dependent on past price development. His expected price is 
usually above the actual price, which means delayed expectations. As a 
result he expects the average price close to the pre-shock price development. 
Secondly, the rational player (RE) is present as a type of player, who offers 
coordination with respect to his strategy of immediate movement to the 
equilibrium. His expectations are in line with price development. Figure 1 
shows individual pricing behavior of rational and adaptive players according 
to type of the player.  
Figure 1: Simulations of Individual Pricing Behavior 
 
 
 Also note the presence of  two type of players x and y mentioned in 
experimental design. Later, results of the laboratory experiment will show 
that behavior of rational player may change if the rest of the individuals are 
not willing to coordinate. In that case rational player is persecuted by lower 
income. As a result, he stops to coordinate and switch to behavior closer to 
the adaptive one.  He slows down his adjustment to the equilibrium because 
of his unconfirmed expectations, thereby causing nominal inertia.  Although 
the player remains fully rational, the best way for him is to behave in an 
adaptive way in order to maximize pay-offs. His behavior therefore might be 
described as adaptively-rational and will be close to the behavior of adaptive 
player. 
 
2.2 Coordination at the Aggregate Level 
 Various cases may arise from the combination of the aggregate 
versus individual level. In the economy, there may appear players who will 
be willing to coordinate, but might be overweighed by subjects who are not 
willing to coordinate or do not coordinate (i.e. adaptive players), which leads 
to no coordination or even discoordination at the aggregate level.  
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 The character of coordination at the aggregate level has to be 
distinguished according to the type of economy present. Results show that a 
purely adaptive economy is considered an economy where no coordination is 
present after the negative shock because price adjustment together with 
formation of expectations is restricted purely to past development. This 
economy consists only of adaptive players. An economy where coordination 
takes place after the negative shock in a more or less successful way consists 
primarily of rational players willing to coordinate. Lastly, an economy with 
negligible coordination or even discoordination consists primarily of players, 
which are not able to cope with the character of an environment or adaptive 
players are present. Simulations in Figure 2 below show how the speed of 
convergence in the economy might be affected by the presence of particular 
players. If the economy is purely adaptive, the development after the shock 
follows backward-looking character. This is depicted by the line with 
slowest adjustment. On the other hand the presence of rational player in the 
economy, who is willing to coordinate, significantly fastens the adjustment 
to equilibrium after the shock. The adjustment to equilibrium is fastest. If 
rational player does not want to coordinate in the economy anymore because 
of his upset expectations, he will follow behavior close to adaptive player. 
This will substantially slow down the speed of adjustment and the 
performance of the economy is represented by the line which lies in the 
middle. 
Figure 2: Simulations of the adjustment process in particular economies 
 
Results  
 The following section will reveal the main results of experiment and 
compare them to basic simulations mentioned above.  
3.1 Results at Aggregate level 
 Figure 3 describes experimental results gained at the aggregate level. 
In order to compare the performance in the economy of the real (RH) and 
nominal treatment (NH), simulated case of purely adaptive economy (AE) 
with no coordination at aggregate level was added.  
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Figure 3: Development of the average price in the economy of NH, RH and AE. 
 
 
 Directly after the monetary shock is imposed, the tendency for 
inertial pricing is significantly lower for players in the real treatment. This 
indicates that sufficient coordination is the case due to frequent presence of 
rational players, who contribute to faster convergence to equilibrium as 
proved by simulations. The tendency of rational player to behave in 
complementary way is very low in this economy. The speed of adjustment of 
this economy is close to the simulated case of highly coordinated economy 
as suggested by Figure 2. 
 In contrast, the nominal treatment exhibits characteristics of no 
coordination or even disccordination at the aggregate level, since its 
performance is even lower than that of adaptive economy. The speed of 
adjustment to the equilibrium is rather slow. We may presume frequent 
presence of players, who are defeated by the nominal frame or the presence 
of rational players who behave in complementary way since it is profitable 
for them. The performance of this treatment is in line with simulated case of 
the economy with rational player who behaves in complementary way to 
players, which are not willing to coordinate. 
 If expectations are to be evaluated, the nominal treatment expects 
price ?̅?𝑒=18 directly after the shock, whereas the real treatment expects 
?̅?𝑒=12. This again confirms that the nominal treatment is more inertial in the 
period after the shock compared to the real treatment.  
 Development at the aggregate level raises the question, to what extent 
it is desirable to behave in the economy in a rational or adaptive way. 
 
3.2 Results of Coordination at Individual Level 
 The following section provides closer look on the frequency of 
particular types of players with respect to the type of treatment.  
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The real treatment 
 Fast adjustment to equilibrium of the real treatment at the aggregate 
level is given by composition of players within the groups. Representative 
group RH 5 (where RH stands for the real human treatment and number of 
group), documents that it takes only 5 periods till the price will adjust to 
equilibrium after the shock, (See Figure 4). Results confirm the presence of 
rational players who speed-up the process of equilibrating. However, 
sometimes also the presence of adaptive players is the case, which is in line 
with the speed of the convergence of group which was not immediate. This 
composition of groups with mix of rational and adaptive players was mostly 
the case of all groups within the real treatment. 
Figure 4: Average price development in Group RH 5 
 
 
 Figure 5 below documents the performance of player x1 from 
representative group, whose pricing strategy definitely reflects rationality. 
Based on his coordination effort, he significantly reduces his price directly 
after the shock.  
Figure 5: Development of income, expected price of player x1 and average price of the other 
n-1 players in the economy, RH5 
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 Since his expectations are not met with the development of the 
average price in the economy, which is much higher, his income is 
significantly reduced in the first post-shock period. From then, the best 
strategy is to behave in an adaptive way with a smooth adjustment to 
equilibrium. This provides proof that rational player who is upset in his 
expectations may switch to adaptive behavior. Behavior of player x2 might 
be also described as a rational one directly after the shock. He also 
coordinates with his price downwards to new equilibrium, but the reduction 
is weaker as opposed to the previous player. After the correction is made, he 
follows adaptive behavior. Pricing behavior of both rational players is in line 
with performed simulations, (See Figure 1). 
 The behavior of player y1 is typically adaptive, since his expectations 
are delayed in the first post-shock period and are in line with the pre-shock 
price development, significantly above the actual average price in the 
economy. Another piece of evidence that the player is adaptive is that his 
individual price exactly reflects the simulation price, which is set by the 
adaptive player of type y after the shock and which equals 18, (See Figure 1).  
Figure 6: Development of income, expected price of player y1 and average price of the other 
n-1 players in the economy, RH5 
 
 
 His adaptive behavior results in significant reduction in income for 
the first post-shock period. Player y2 exhibits similar behavior and even 
overshoots his expectations, which are then above the pre-shock average 
price. He also sets an adaptive price of 18 after the shock, which results in 
significant reduction in income. As a result this player reacts in the next 
period by correcting his expectations downwards. This is met with success, 
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since his income immediately rises. From then, he follows the same adaptive 
behavior like player y1.  
 On average the group is coordinated in a good way, since the 
expected price is in line with the average price development and income is 
maximized most of the time, (See Figure 7). Coordination was mostly 
induced by rational players, who significantly correct their expectations 
towards the equilibrium in the first post-shock period, which is in line with 
flexible price adjustment. This also had a positive effect on the other 
adaptive players in the group, who reacted in the consequent period by 
correcting their expectations towards the average price. This contributed to 
the fact that the average price adjusted very quickly after the shock to the 
new equilibrium. This is also documented by the size of income, which is 
maximized for most of the time, the exemption being the first post-shock 
period. Rewards of rational players were slightly higher on average than that 
of adaptive players, which suggests that the real treatment benefits these 
players due to conditions prevailed at aggregate level. 
Figure 7: Development of average price, expected price and average income in RH5 
 
 
The nominal treatment 
 Groups present in the nominal treatment are mostly characterized by 
discoordination due to the fact that subjects have to cope with the nominal 
frame. The development of the average price in representative group NH5 is 
highly inertial, with a very slow speed of adjustment to the equilibrium, 
which is attained almost at the end of the post-shock phase, but eventually 
overshoot takes place. Slow adjustment suggests that confusion by nominal 
variables was so severe that some individuals were not willing to coordinate. 
The average price is even higher than the pre-shock level (See Figure 8 
below). A closer look at individual pricing behavior shows that 
representative group consists mostly of players who are defeated by the 
nominal frame, less adaptive players are present. Most of the groups in the 
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nominal treatment exhibit similar features which in turn affects the speed of 
convergence at the aggregate level. 
Figure 8: Average price development in NH5 
 
 
 The player x1 is typical example of the player defeated by the 
nominal frame, who is not willing to coordinate to equilibrium.  After the 
shock he raises his price to considerably high levels. His expectations are 
high and significantly above the average price in the economy. 
 Player x2 is also not willing to coordinate, since he does not react 
anyhow after the shock and is still fixing his price at the same level. Since he 
achieves low income, he corrects his expectations about the average price 
upwards to 22 for 6 periods. This is in line with individual price, which is 
adjusted upwards to 17 and remains fixed for these periods. Although the 
player is penalized by quite a low income in these periods, he does not 
change his strategy anyhow. Then in the period 33 he corrects his 
expectations downwards, followed by price adjustment and is again fixing 
expectations and the price for the next three periods. From then he tries to 
adjust to the equilibrium in adaptive way. 
 Player y1 retains his individual price at the same high pre-shock level, 
because he expects high average price. This is not met with the success as 
income reduction follows. As a result he reduces his price in the second 
period two units below the simulated price of the adaptive player and is 
rewarded by almost maximum income. His adjustment is full of downward 
and upwards swings, since he is probably confused by nominal values. He 
ends up overshooting the equilibrium price. 
 Player y2 was the only one who reduced the price after the shock, 
which was in line with his expectations. In other words he tried to offer 
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coordination after the shock, but due to the behavior of player x1 (who set a 
high price) and player x2 (who was fixing the price), the average price was 
quite high and the coordinator achieved a low income. As a result he was no 
longer willing to coordinate and started to behave in complementary way to 
other players. As a result his pricing behavior became highly inertial. 
 The player x1 later decided to correct his price closer to the 
equilibrium at the moment when player y2 was already upset with his 
expectations. This shows that severe discoordination is present. Players who 
are willing to coordinate in a particular time are prevented from doing so, 
because other players are not willing to do so due to their confusion by 
nominal values. Coordination effort is persecuted by lower income and this 
provides incentives to behave in complementary way. As soon as the other 
players decide to adjust their price to equilibrium, because they start to see 
through the nominal veil, they are hindered in their behavior by upset 
coordinators, who already gave up any effort. Thus, the formation of 
expectations and consequent pricing behavior is much more difficult under 
the nominal frame, which leads instead to a discoordination at aggregate 
level.  
 If we have to evaluate the performance of the group NH5 on average 
in Figure 9, discoordination has a serious impact on the average price and 
expectations, which are fairly inertial.  
Figure 9: Development of average price, expected price and average income in NH5 
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during three periods, but in consequent periods it grew only steadily, mostly 
being between 30 and 35. 
 
Conclusion: 
 We tried to verify that the ability to coordinate under strategic 
complementarity is substantially affected by mutual interactive development 
at the individual and aggregate level. With help of the laboratory experiment 
inspired by Fehr and Tyran (2001) we conducted simulations, followed by 
evaluation of results gained at aggregate and individual level. 
 Simulations performed at the individual level reveal that basically 
two types of players are present. Either adaptive player not willing to 
coordinate or rational player willing to coordinate is present. Additionally, 
simulations at the aggregate level suggest that the presence of rational player 
increases coordination in the economy and speeds up consequent adjustment 
to the equilibrium. In contrast the presence of the player, who is not willing 
to coordinate (either adaptive player or upset rational player) slows down the 
adjustment to the equilibrium.  
 Experimental results at the aggregate and individual level are in line 
with our simulations. As a result we may confirm our presumptions that 
coordination, no coordination or discoordination exists at the aggregate level. 
The real treatment consists mainly of mix of rational and adaptive players 
with fast adjustment to equilibrium. Additionally, players have no tendency 
to exhibit complementary behavior in direction of naïve agents. This 
contributes to sufficient coordination at the aggregate level in this economy. 
The nominal treatment consists mainly of adaptive players or players 
confused by the nominal frame. Players tend to behave more in 
complementary way in direction of naïve adjustment. As a result, this 
treatment is rather representative of no coordination or even discoordination 
at the aggregate level.  
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